新冠病毒在全球蔓延，这次全球性的灾难是否会改变全球化的进程，又将如何改变世界，美国《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）杂志邀请了来自世界各地的12位思想家谈一谈他们对疫情后全球秩序的预测，我们挑选了其中六个预测与大家分享：
1
A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free一个开放、繁荣与自由皆倒退的世界
by Stephen M. Walt
斯蒂芬·沃尔特
（哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院贝尔福科学与国际事务中心教授）
The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. Governments of all types will adopt emergency measures to manage the crisis, and many will be loath to relinquish these new powers when the crisis is over. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. China, South Korea and Singapore have responded best. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”
新冠疫情将强化国家权力、加强民族主义。疫情之下，各种类型的政府都会采取紧急措施以管控危机。而当这场危机结束时，它们中的许多将不情愿交出这些新得到的权力。新冠疫情也将加速权力和影响力由西方向东方的转移。在这场疫情中，中国、韩国和新加坡应对得最为出色，相比之下，欧洲和美国则反应迟缓、应对失策，这进一步损害了西方的“形象”。
What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.
不变的则是世界政治最为根本的冲突本质。以往的疫情（包括1918-1919年大流感在内）并没有终结大国间的敌对或者开启全球合作的新时代。本次新冠疫情也同样不会。由于公民期待本国政府能够保护他们、国家和公司会寻求降低未来的脆弱性，我们将看到当前如火如荼的全球化进一步消退。
In short, COVID-19 will create a world that is less open, less prosperous, and less free. It did not have to be this way, but the combination of a deadly virus, inadequate planning, and incompetent leadership has placed humanity on a new and worrisome path.
总之，新冠疫情将会创造出一个不再那么开放、繁荣与自由的世界。事情本可以不必如此，但是致命病毒、计划不周与无能领导这三者的结合已经使人类走上了一条全新的、但却令人担忧的道路。
2
The End of Globalization as We Know It
我们所认知的全球化终结
by Robin Niblett罗宾·尼布莱特（英国皇家国际事务研究所所长）
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization.
新冠疫情可能是压垮经济全球化的最后一根稻草。
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.
中国不断增长的经济和军事实力已经激起了美国两党与其斗争的决心。为实现碳减排目标而施加的社会和政治压力不断增加，已经使许多公司对长距离供应链的依赖受到质疑。目前，新冠疫情正在迫使政府、企业和社会加强长期应对经济孤立的能力。
It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.
在这样的背景下，世界几乎不可能回到21世纪初那种互利共赢的全球化状态。一旦各国再无意愿保护全球经济一体化所带来的共同利益，那么20世纪建立起的全球经济治理架构将迅速萎缩。届时，政治领导人将需要极大的自我克制来维持国际合作，并防止向公开地缘政治竞争的方向倒退。
Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.
向公民们证明自己可应对疫情危机将使领导人获得一些政治资本，而那些无力管控疫情的领导人只会极力推卸责任。
3A More China-Centric Globalization
更加以中国为中心的全球化
by Kishore Mahbubani马凯硕（新加坡国立大学亚洲研究所特聘研究员）
The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions.It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.
COVID-19的疫情不会从根本上改变全球经济方向。它只会加速已经开始的变化：从以美国为中心的全球化转向更以中国为中心的全球化。
Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement. The Chinese people have also experienced an explosion of cultural confidence. They believe they can compete anywhere.
为什么这种趋势会持续下去？因为美国人对全球化和国际贸易失去了信心，不管有没有美国总统唐纳德·特朗普，美国人认为自由贸易协定都是有害的。相比之下，中国并没有丧失信心。这存在一些深层次的历史原因。中国领导人很清楚，从1842年到1949年的百年屈辱是自满和闭关锁国的恶果。相比之下，中国过去几十年的经济复苏是参与全球化的结果。中国人民也经历了文化自信的大爆发，更加相信自己的竞争力。
Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice.
因此，正如马凯硕在《中国赢了吗？》一书中提及美国将面临两种选择。如果美国的首要目标是保持全球领先地位，那么它将不得不与中国展开一场政治和经济上的零和地缘政治竞赛。然而，如果美国的目标是改善社会状况不断恶化下美国人民的福利，那么美国应该与中国合作。
4
The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors
新冠疫情的历史将由胜利者书写
by John Allen约翰·艾伦（前美国海军陆战队上将）
As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways.
一如既往，新冠疫情危机的历史将由胜利者书写。每个国家的越来越多的个体正以各种前所未有而令人冲击的方式感受着这场疫情所带来的社会紧张。
Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome. To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy, multilateralism, and universal health care. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of decisive, authoritarian rule.To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of authoritarian rule.
不可避免的是，那些凭借其独特的政治经济体制抑或是公共卫生政策观点而得以保全的国家，将会对其余那些经历毁灭性打击的国家宣告胜利。这将会是民主、多边主义和全民医保的伟大胜利。而对另一些国家来说，这将清楚地展现果断的中央集权统治的好处。
Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.
不管怎样，这次危机将以一种前所未有的方式将国际权力结构重新洗牌。新冠疫情将持续抑制经济活动并加剧国家间的紧张态势。长远来看，在企业倒闭、劳动力失业的情况下，这次疫情很可能重创全球经济产出能力。这种混乱的风险对发展中国家和其他贫穷工人比重较大的国家来说影响尤为巨大。国际体系将由此承受巨大的压力，并导致国家内部和国家间不稳定且广泛的冲突。
5
More Failed States
更多的失败国家
by Richard N. Haass理查德·哈斯（美国对外关系委员会会长）
Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.
尽管理查德·哈斯并不喜欢用“持久”一词作论断，但他认为新冠病毒危机至少会在几年内促使大多数国家内顾，更加关注国内事务，而非境外之事。哈斯预计，由于供应链的脆弱性，国家将朝着选择性的自给自足（以及随之而来的脱钩）迈出更大的步伐。国家还会表现出对大规模移民更强烈的反对。同时，鉴于资源需要被用于国内重建和应对这场危机的经济后果，国家对处理地区或全球问题（包括气候变化）将具有更少的意愿或做出更少的承诺。
Many countries will have difficulty recovering, with state weakness and failed states becoming even more prevalent.
许多国家将难以从这场危机中恢复过来，国家贫弱与失败国家将在世界上更加普遍。
I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.
许多国家将难以从这场危机中恢复过来，国家贫弱与失败国家将在世界上更加普遍。这场危机很可能会加剧大国之间的持续恶化以及欧洲一体化的衰退。就其积极一面来说，全球公共卫生治理可能会有所加强。但总的来说，根植于全球化的危机将削弱而非增强世界应对危机的意愿与能力。
6
The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test
美国未能通过这场领导力测试
by Kori Schake科里·舍克（美国国际战略研究所副所长）
The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence.The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested.
由于美国政府的狭隘自私与无能为力，美国将不再被视为国际领导者。这场疫情的全球影响本可以通过国际组织提供更加丰富有效的信息，以便给各国政府更多时间进行准备并调配资源到最需要的地方而被极大削弱。通过国际组织提供更加丰富有效的信息，以便给各国政府更多时间进行准备并调配资源到最需要的地方，这场疫情的全球影响本可以得到极大削弱。这也是美国本应当组织的事情，以此显示美国虽自私自利但也不尽然如此。